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Water Resources Control Board to adopt implementing regulations; the Board is authorized to adopt regulations on an emergency basis concerning the requirements for demonstrating financial responsibility and establishing corrective action requirements. As amended March 26, 2001, this bill would withdraw
the Board's specific authority to adopt such emergency regulations to implement those provisions. [S. Appr]
AB 969 (Chan), as introduced February 23,2001, would
establish an additional deduction from income to reduce the
share of cost requirements in the Medi-Cal medically needy
program for individuals and families. The bill would provide

for work incentive deductions and deductions for conservatorship and other fees for medically needy individuals in longterm care. AB 969 would also amend the Medi-Cal program
for aged and disabled individuals who have income up to
100% of the federal poverty level by increasing the couple
income deduction from $310 to $425, and increasing both
the individual and couple deductions annually, beginning
January 1, 2004, for cost of living adjustments. DHS would
be required to adopt emergency implementing regulations
which, along with their first readoption, would be exempt
from OAL review. [A. Health]
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under
the administrative oversight of the Milton Marks Commission on California State Government Organization and
Economy (also known as the "Little Hoover Commission").
In Government Code section 8543 et seq., SB 37 delegates to
BSA most of the duties previously performed by the Auditor
General's Office, such as examining and reporting annually
upon the financial statements prepared by the executive branch
of the state, performing other related assignments (such as
performance audits) that are mandated by statute, and administering the California Whistleblower Protection Act, Government Code section 8547 et seq. BSA is also required to
conduct audits of state and local government requested by
the Joint Legislative Audit Committee (JLAC) to the extent
that funding is available. BSA is headed by the State Auditor,
appointed by the Governor to a four-year term from a list of
three qualified individuals submitted by the JLAC.
On August 3, 2000, Governor Davis announced his appointment of Elaine M. Howle as State Auditor. Howle, formerly the deputy state auditor, has been with BSA since 1993.
She previously worked for the Employment Development
Department from 1992-93 and for the Office of the Auditor
General from 1983-92. She is a certified public accountant
and a certified government financial manager.

MAJOR PROJECTS
Performance Audit of State Bar
In 1997, then-Governor Wilson vetoed a bill providing
the California State Bar-the state's attorney regulatory
agency -with its primary source of revenue; the veto led to
the Bar's layoff of almost 500 employees during 1998 and a

near-shutdown of the entire agency, including its attorney discipline system. In 1999, Governor
Davis signed SB 144 (Schiff and Hertzberg) (Chapter 342,
Statutes of 1999), which once again authorized the Bar to
collect licensing fees from its members but restricted the Bar's
use of those fees and required BSA to conduct a performance
audit of the Bar's operations between July and December 2000
(see agency report on STATE BAR for related discussion).
In compliance with SB 144, BSA reviewed several aspects of the Bar's operations and released State Bar of California: It Has Improved Its Disciplinary Process, Stewardship of Members' Fees, and Administrative Practices, but
Its Cost Recovery and Controls Over Expenses Need
Strengthening in April 2001. BSA's findings in these areas
are as follows.
- State Bar Disciplinary Process. When the Bar was
forced to lay off its discipline staff in 1998, it had about 4,400
open complaints in its enforcement inventory; during the shutdown, it accumulated an additional 3,000 complaints against
attorneys-resulting in an enormous backlog of
uninvestigated complaints. To reduce the backlog, the Bar
implemented a plan to prioritize cases so that the most serious complaints receive attention first; cases alleging minor
violations are now mediated in the Bar's intake unit, dismissed, or referred to other remedies. BSA found that this
prioritization system enables the Bar's investigators to focus
most of their attention on serious cases that will likely result
in discipline, and lessens the number of cases flowing forward for prosecution, hearing, and review by the State Bar
Court. According to BSA, "the data indicate that the priority
system is enabling the State Bar to use its resources better
than in 1995."
BSA also reported that the Bar has revised the cost model
on which its "cost recovery" system is based to increase the
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amount it will charge attorneys who are ultimately disciplined
and/or require a payout by the Bar's Client Security Fund (which
reimburses clients who are victimized by intentional attorney
dishonesty). However, the auditors noted that the cost model
has not been updated to reflect the current salaries for Bar
employees and that, although it has been charging disciplined
attorneys more for its costs associated with investigation and
discipline, the Bar continues to have trouble collecting these
charges. Since its cost recovery efforts are poor, BSA found
that the Bar "uses a greater portion of membership fees than
necessary to support its Client Security Fund and disciplinary
programs. Consequently, members must pay a fee that is higher
than necessary." BSA recommended that the Bar participate in
the state's "offset program," under which the State Controller's
Office and the Franchise Tax Board can offset from an
individual's tax refund any amounts owed to state agencies.
- Restrictions on Use of Fees. SB 144 prohibits the Bar

from using mandatory Bar dues on its Conference of Delegates and its subject-matter "sections"; SB 144 also restricts
the amount the Bar can spend on lobbying and related activities that exceed the parameters established in Keller v. State
Bar, 496 U.S. I (1990). However, the bill permits the Bar to
obtain voluntary payments from members to support these
two activities. BSA found that the Bar has responded to these
provisions by improving the way in which it accounts for
revenues and expenses related to its mandatory and voluntary programs. It established two new funds to account for
the Conference's activities and for lobbying activities outside the Keller parameters (the Bar had already established a
separate fund for section activities); BSA found that no mandatory fees were used to fund either the Conference or the
sections during 2000. In addition, BSA found that the Bar
has changed its system of accounting for section activities so
it has better assurance that mandatory fees are not used to
provide administrative support for the sections.
- Procurement Process. BSA reported that the Bar has

also improved its procurement policies since 1998. The Bar
achieved this by establishing a purchasing card program to
strengthen controls over travel and minor business expenses.
It also established competitive bidding requirements to enhance control over its contracting practices. However, BSA
found some flaws in these policies. BSA identified approximately $4,400 in questionable transactions that did not represent prudent use of Bar funds in its review of 36 monthly
statements for purchasing cards. This audit sample also disclosed that the Bar paid about $2,600 for purchasing card
transactions without required receipts for the purchases being provided by the employee responsible for the charges.
The Bar was also found to have exceeded its general fund
budget for discretionary spending in the business expense
account by about $5,500. Finally, BSA discovered that the
Bar did not always enforce its policies and procedures for
contracting and, thus, cannot be sure the expenses are appropriate and that members' fees are supporting only necessary
purchases. BSA recommended that the Bar clarify definitions

of purchases that are appropriate business expenses and enforce its policy of requiring receipts for purchases over $25
to prevent abuse of the purchasing card program and ensure
employees are using the cards appropriately.

Board of Pharmacy's Complaint Handling Practices
In April 2001, BSA released a report entitled Investigations of Improper Activities by State Employees: July 2000
Through January 2001. In a chapter entitled Board of Pharmacy: Gross Inefficiency in Processing Consumer Complaints
and Failure to Record and Pay Overtime, BSA noted that it
received an allegation that the Board had a backlog of consumer complaints and was not doing its job to investigate
incoming complaints. BSA investigated and substantiated the
allegation. Specifically, BSA found that the Board's established timeframes to resolve complaints-up to 290 days for
complex complaints and 140 days for all others-are excessive when compared to the timeframes mandated by law or
regulation for other consumer protection agencies.
Second, BSA found that the Board fails to meet its own
excessive timeframes. Between January 1, 1994 and March
6, 2000, it took the Board an average of 441 days to close
5,265 complaints. Of those complaints, the Board resolved
only 35% of its high-risk complaints within 290 days and
only 20% of its less complex cases within its 140-day goal.
As of March 6,2000, the Board had not resolved 770 of 1,552
open complaints within its maximum 290-day goal. Although
the Board's goal is to complete the investigation phase of its
enforcement process within five months, BSA found that
Board staff takes on average nine months to complete investigations after the complaint is assigned to an inspector.
Third, BSA examined the Board's system for prioritizing complaints. Based on the subject matter of complaints,
the Board categorizes its high-risk complaints as Priority 1
(urgent-immediate), Priority 2 (rapid), Priority 3 (active investigation), or Priority 4 (standard, consistent turnaround).
BSA found that this system "does not ensure that complaints
involving potential injury are investigated within the maximum allowed time of five months." BSA found that, regardless of risk, the Board took longer than five months to complete about 60% of its investigations.
Fourth, BSA found that the Board has not maintained
adequate staff to ensure timely complaint resolution. The
Board is authorized to hire only 19 inspectors and two supervising inspectors (all of whom are pharmacists) to cover the
entire state of California. In fiscal year 1999-2000, there was
a 35.7% vacancy rate for inspector and supervising inspector
positions at the Board; 7.5 of the Board's 21 inspector positions were vacant. Had those positions been filled, BSA projected that each inspector would have been able to resolve an
additional 51 complaints per year and a backlog would not
exist. Finally, BSA noted that the Board failed to maintain
records adequate to ensure that staff were compensated for
all overtime hours worked, possibly in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.
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BSA concluded that "these concerns reflect gross inefficiency on the part of the Board. Delays in resolving complaints increase the risk that those violating pharmacy laws
will continue to make mistakes that affect the public health,
safety, or welfare of California consumers."
In a written response, the Board agreed it had not investigated and completed cases promptly in the past, and stated
that it is taking action to address these concerns. The Board
said that it is focusing on clearing away the existing backlog
of cases (and is down to 393 pending complaints more than
six months old as of March 8, 2001) and will then be better
able to prioritize the remaining complaints. The Board noted
that it has increased its salaries for pharmacists, hired eight
inspectors and one supervising inspector during the seven
months prior to January 2001, and expects to fill the remaining three vacant inspector positions soon. The Board also
stated it plans to increase consumer awareness by adding a
toll-free consumer complaint line and posting this number in
every pharmacy later in 2001.

The Energy Crisis
In Energy Deregulation: The Benefits of Competition
Were Undermined by Structural Flaws in the Market, Unsuccessful Oversight, and Uncontrollable Competitive
Forces (March 2001), BSA reviewed the causes of the energy crisis that began during the summer of 2000. In 1996,
the legislature enacted and then-Governor Wilson signed AB
1890 (Brulte), moving California towards electricity deregulation in hopes of lower retail prices and expanded power
services. However, the bill-and its implementation by the
Public Utilities Commission (PUC), the California Power
Exchange (PX), and Independent System Operator (ISO), and
other entities created by the legislature to participate in the
deregulation experiment -resulted in catastrophic market
failure, including excessive prices, power outages and intentional disruptions, and a bankruptcy declaration by one of the
state's three investor-owned utilities. The poor credit rating
of all three utilities has forced the state to purchase electricity for its citizens to the tune of $5.1 billion at this writingmost of which will be borne by current and future ratepayers,
none of whom voted for deregulation (see agency report on
PUC for detailed information).
BSA's study concluded that a "complex combination of
factors" has resulted in the failure of deregulation. That "complex combination" includes (1) the terms of the legislation
mandating deregulation; (2) its implementation by the PUCparticularly the Commission's requirement that investorowned utilities sell all the power they generated themselves
into "sequential short-term markets" or "spot markets" operated by the PX and ISO, and its initial refusal to let the utilities enter into long-term contracts when prices were low; (3)
the utilities' failure to immediately secure long-term contracts
when the PUC finally authorized them to do so; and (4) "misjudgments" on the part of the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the PUC as to the effective-

ness of their corrective actions. Beginning in 1998, marketing-monitoring groups within the ISO and PX warned FERC
and the PUC of potential problems with the market structure
and rules. These predictions proved to be accurate, but neither FERC or the PUC adequately addressed these concerns
at that time.
BSA also noted some factors contributing to the crisis
that are "outside the scope of any regulator or agency" - such
as unusual weather patterns (a drought limiting the availability of hydroelectric power), steep increases in natural gas
prices, and the state's failure to invest in new powerplants
despite growth in population and industry in the western region and an increased demand for electricity.
BSA made four major recommendations: (1) "eliminate
the opportunity for strategic bidding" by stopping real-time
bidding and executing forward (long-term) contracts with
generators, halting "ancillary services" spot market bidding
and buying these forecasted advance reserve purchases
through sealed bids, and considering contracting for generation capacity; (2) avoid using a single statewide wholesale
price cap as a check on abuse, because that then becomes the
"targeted bid price"; instead, BSA recommended that caps be
imposed where "markets are found to be noncompetitive and
supply is being withheld...."; (3) give the ISO authority to
schedule powerplant maintenance, removing that power from
the generators-who were allegedly manipulating outages to
limit supply and escalate the real-time bid market clearing
price; and (4) limit the amount of market data published on
Web sites-here, BSA found that the posting of bid and price
data immediately after the fact, combined with readily available ISO data and PX pricing models, facilitated the "gaming" of prices to artificially high levels; instead, BSA recommended that bidding and winning bid data should be delayed
a full year before public release in any form.

DCA's Oversight of Consumer Protection Programs
In Department of Consumer Affairs: Lengthy Delays
and Poor Monitoring Weaken Consumer Protection (November 2000), BSA reviewed the Department of Consumer
Affairs' (DCA) role in overseeing its 35 occupational licensing boards and bureaus. Created in the Consumer Affairs Act
of 1970, Business and Professions Code section 300 et seq.,
DCA is charged with administrative oversight of its constituent agencies, which are in turn charged with licensing trades
and professions, setting standards for licensees, enforcement,
and consumer education. BSA recognized that DCA's boards
are semi-autonomous in that they are controlled by politically-appointed board members, and that the DCA Director's
direct influence over the boards is limited to reviewing agencyadopted regulations (other than those related to licensing).
However, DCA has several independent duties, including
auditing and reviewing its agencies' licensing and enforcement activities; requiring boards to submit reports on any
phase of their operations; investigating the work of boards
and making copies of their records and data; examining the
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performance of any board contract; and recommending to the
I oards and/or to the legislature any changes it deems necessary to protect consumer interests.
Based on its review of four DCA agencies (two boards
and two bureaus) and its surveys of others, BSA concluded
that DCA "has not fulfilled its oversight responsibility, allowing weaknesses in licensing and complaint processing to
continue within its boards and bureaus." BSA found that the
Department attends to its oversight duties primarily through
its internal audit office and through "desk reviews" of information about its boards and bureaus. However, during the
audit period, the chief of the internal audit office spent most
of her time on special projects and personnel issues other than
oversight, and the resources of the office had been diverted
to other projects. Further, BSA found that DCA's "desk review" process relies too heavily on information about its
boards/bureaus given to it by its boards/bureaus; the only time
DCA's boards and bureaus are independently evaluated is
during their occasional "sunset review" by the Joint Legislative Sunset Review Committee, which occurs for some agencies only once every six years. As a result, many DCA boards
take too long to process license applications. Many have failed
to establish time goals to ensure the prompt processing of
complaints; others have established time goals that are too
long; and still others fail to comply with time goals they have
established. "Using its current oversight methods, the department was unable to detect these problems among its boards
and bureaus and provide meaningful corrective intervention."
BSA also reviewed the extent to which DCA boards/bureaus
comply with the Department's complaint disclosure policy
(which was adopted in 1979 and, at this writing, is under review by DCA), and found that 19 of 27 boards surveyed do
not follow the policy.
To ensure that its boards and bureaus are providing timely
and effective consumer protection services, BSA recommended
that DCA (1) establish a plan to periodically review and evaluate the licensing and enforcement functions of its boards; (2)
better utilize the resources of its internal audit office to review
each board and bureau consistently; (3) ensure that each of its
boards and bureaus establish monitoring systems and processing goals; and (4) ensure that its boards and bureaus are consistent in releasing complaint information to the public.
In its response, DCA noted that, during the audit period,
its internal audit office had been plagued with vacancies and
was required to attend to the Y2K project, which affected all of
its agencies and all consumers of the services of its agencies.
Since that threat has passed, the new DCA Director has taken
steps to ensure that vacancies have been filled and audit plans
are approved and implemented. DCA also noted that, due to its
lack of authority over its boards, compliance with its complaint
disclosure policy is discretionary and not mandatory.

DOI Outreach Payment Settlements
and Enforcement Practices
The 1994 Northridge earthquake was the most costly

natural disaster in California history, devastating businesses,
homes, and lives, and causing $27 billion in commercial and
residential destruction. Following the quake, over 600,000
insured homeowners and businesses filed claims with their
insurers. Thereafter, thousands of quake victims were forced
to file complaints with the Department of Insurance (DOI),
complaining of unfair claims settlement practices by their
insurance companies. In January and February of 1999, DOI
auditors completed extensive surveys, called "market conduct examinations," of four insurance companies' claims handling practices in connection with the Northridge earthquake;
identified numerous alleged violations of Insurance Code
section 790.03(h), which prohibits insurers from engaging in
unfair claims settlement practices; and recommended that the
Department levy over $3 billion in fines against the companies. Instead, then-Insurance Commissioner Chuck
Quackenbush entered into "settlements" with the four insurers for a total of $12.3 million, and directed them to deposit
the settlement money into nonprofit "educational" foundations that used the money to promote Quackenbush. When
the scheme was uncovered (with the help of an internal
whistleblower), Quackenbush resigned (see agency report on
DOI for detailed information).
In Department of Insurance: Recent Settlements and
Enforcement Practices Raise Serious Concerns About Its
Regulation of Insurance Companies (October 2000), BSA
sharply criticized DOI and Quackenbush, finding that
Quackenbush "abused his authority when he required insurers to pay $12.3 million in settlement outreach payments directly to nonprofit organizations and vendors for purposes
not specifically related to his regulatory responsibilities." The
report went on to criticize as "imprudent" other outreach payments totaling $16.5 million that, while apparently legal in
the sense that they were made for purposes related to DOI's
regulatory authority, placed the funds outside the reach of
state purchasing and expenditure controls and allowed the
nonprofits to spend the funds for questionable purposes without DOI or legislative oversight.
Further, BSA noted that many of the settlements with
insurers failed to include any monetary penalties against insurance companies found to have violated certain provisions
of the Insurance Code and the Unfair Practices Act, such as
handling claims in bad faith or receiving illegal monetary
benefits on amounts deposited in escrow accounts. According to BSA, "the Department also omitted critical enforcement provisions from settlement agreements, thereby further
eroding its ability to effectively regulate insurers." The report noted that by not including cease and desist provisions
and failing to impose fines, it appeared that the settlements
"absolved them [the insurers] of misconduct." Additionally,
by concealing the amount and nature of the settlement payments, and structuring the settlements so that the violations
were not reported to the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, DOI limited the amount of information available to other state regulators and consumers and increased
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BSA also found that DOI does not manage its enforcement activities effectively, allowing violations of the law to
go unpunished. BSA found that DOI's legal division does not
promptly resolve complaints referred to it by other Department bureaus and that DOI is unable to track enforcement
cases because of a lack of an integrated monitoring system
between the different branches of DOI. The report also found
that poor controls over fine payments, cost reimbursements,
and outreach activities inhibit DOI's ability to manage these
payments and ensure that funds are used to further legitimate
regulatory purposes.
BSA recommended that DOI require insurers to remit all
settlement payments directly to the Department in order to
maintain direct control over expenditures for outreach and
education. BSA also recommended that the legislature consider amending the Insurance Code to prohibit settlement
payments directly to nonprofit organizations, foundations, or
vendors. In addition, BSA recommended that where egregious
violations are identified, the insurer should be required to pay
an appropriate penalty. DOI should clearly state the amount
of such penalty, the date each penalty is due, and all other
settlement terms in public settlement agreements that include
an order to cease and desist the activities.
Finally, BSA recommended that DOI improve its enforcement program by developing an integrated case tracking system, reviewing open cases periodically, assigning and resolving the existing backlog of open cases in the legal division,
requiring insurers to remit payment to DOI directly (and setting up a standardized system for receiving such payments),
and strengthening accounting controls within the Department.

PUC Contract Development and Management
In California Public Utilities Commission: Weaknesses
in Its Contracting Process Have Resulted in Questionable
Payments (March 2000), BSA noted that the Public Utilities
Commission (PUC)-which has broad powers to regulate
investor-owned and operated natural gas, electric, telephone,
water, sewer, steam, and transportation companies in California-employs more than 800 people who provide a broad
range of expertise. However, the Commission must frequently
contract with outside consultants when it does not have the
necessary resources to provide certain services. During the
1998-99 fiscal year, the PUC spent $11 million of its $106
million budget on contracting services. However, BSA found
that the PUC did not always adequately develop and manage
these contracts. BSA found numerous deficiencies, including
failure to consistently seek competitive bids, clearly define
the scope of contracted work, and prepare reasonably detailed
budgets and progress schedules. The report also noted a major deficiency in that the PUC did not always review its consultants' invoices to ensure their charges are appropriate and
sufficiently supported. As a result, the Commission paid hundreds of thousands of dollars on invoices with inappropriate
or insufficiently detailed and supported charges. These improper payments are ultimately made by consumers because

the PUC receives most of its funding from assessments on
utility companies which pass those costs on to the public
through increased utility rates.
In conducting this audit, BSA reviewed 25 PUC contracts
entered into or amended during 1998-99; BSA also followed
up to determine whether the PUC had taken corrective action
in response to a May 1999 BSA audit of the Commission's
handling of a consultant hired to investigate the 1998 San Francisco power outage. [17:1 CRLR 223] Although BSA determined that the PUC consistently identified the need for outside contracts and monitored the progress of consultant work,
"it did not always perform other important steps in developing
the contracts that we reviewed." For example, the PUC did not
always use appropriate selection methods, establish progress
schedules, and set reasonably detailed budgets. Further, and
despite a BSA recommendation in its May 1999 audit, the PUC
did not always adequately review its contractors' invoices; BSA
found that, of the $5 million paid on these 25 contracts in 199899, the Commission made at least $650,000 in questionable
payments due to inadequate review.
Based on its audit, BSA recommended that the PUC: (1)
include reasonably detailed budgets and progress schedules
in its contracts; (2) solicit competitive bids for contracts whenever possible; (3) establish a policy requiring a minimum level
of detail for consultant invoices prior to payment; and (4)
require contract managers to review charges and expenses
contained in consultants' invoices to ensure that only proper
payments are made.

2000 LEGISLATION
AB 1730 (Cardenas), as amended August 28, 2000, addresses lead poisoning prevention and, among other things,
requires BSA to conduct a follow-up assessment of the effectiveness of specified Department of Health Services child lead
poisoning regulations, and submit the results of the assessment to certain legislative committees by May 1,2001. Governor Davis signed AB 1730 on September 18, 2000 (Chapter 540, Statutes of 2000).
AB 2866 (Migden), as amended June 15, 2000, requires
BSA to report to the legislature and the Governor specific findings relating to pharmaceutical and medical supply procurement for offenders in state custody. The bill was signed by the
Governor on July 8, 2000 (Chapter 127, Statutes of 2000).

2001 LEGISLATION
SB 413 (Speier). The California Whistleblower Protection Act authorizes the State Auditor to conduct an investigative audit upon receiving confirmation that an employee or
state agency has engaged in an improper governmental activity, and (with certain exceptions) protects the identity of the
person who provides the information which initiated the investigative audit. The Act also provides that a person who
engages in acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, or
similar acts against a state employee or applicant for state
employment for having made a protected disclosure, as de-
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fined, is subject to civil liability and criminal penalties. As
amended March 26, 2001, this bill would require the State
Auditor to prepare a written explanation of the Act, distribute
it to each state agency, and post it on BSA's Web site. Each
state agency would also be required to print and post the notice at its offices and send it by electronic mail to employees
of the agency every six months.
SB 413 would also require the State Auditor to send a
copy of any investigative report conducted under the Act
which finds that an employee engaged in improper governmental activity to the employee's appointing power. The appointing power would then have to serve a notice of adverse
action upon that employee or set forth in writing reasons for
not taking adverse action. A copy of this notice of adverse
action or reasons for not taking adverse action must also be
provided to the State Personnel Board and the State Auditor
by the appointing power.
In addition, SB 413 would repeal existing law which requires any state officer or employee filing a complaint of reprisal or retaliation to have also previously filed a complaint
of improper governmental activity with the State Auditor or
with the Inspector General.
A person cannot be retaliated against under the State Civil
Service Act because he has opposed a practice that has been
made an unlawful practice, or made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under the Act. This bill would establish that the burden of proof is on the supervisor, manager, employee, or appointing power to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that an alleged adverse employment action would have

occurred for legitimate, independent reasons, if a person demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that opposing any
practice made an unlawful employment practice under the act,
or making a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the
act, was a contributing factor in any adverse employment action taken against him or her. Finally, SB 413 would provide
that its provisions shall apply to the California State University and the University of California. [S. Appr]
ABX1 1 (Keeley), as amended January 31, 2001, is part
of the state's response to the unprecedented energy crisis that
began during the summer of 2000. The bill authorizes the
Department of Water Resources (DWR)-until January 1,
2003- to enter into long-term contracts for the purchase of
electric power and to sell that power to retail end-use customers and to local publicly owned electric utilities at not
more than DWR's acquisition costs; the bill appropriates $500
million from the general fund to DWR to purchase power.
The bill also authorizes DWR to issue revenue bonds, with
the authorization of the Department of Finance and the State
Treasurer, to finance electricity purchases, and limits the
amount that they may be issued to four times the amount of
annual revenues generated from wholesale power. ABX1 1
also establishes in the State Treasury a new Department of
Water Resources "Electric Power Fund," and requires all revenues payable to DWR under the bill to be deposited in the
fund; and requires BSA to conduct a financial and performance audit of DWR's implementation of the bill. This bill
was signed by the Governor on February 1, 2001 (Chapter 4,
Statutes of 2001-02, First Extraordinary Session).
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e Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO) has been providing fiscal and policy advice to the California legislature for more than 55 years. It is known for its fiscal and programmatic expertise and nonpartisan analyses
of the state's budget. Overseen by the 16-member bipartisan Joint Legislative Budget Committee (JLBC), LAO currently has a staff of 49 people. The analytical staff is divided into seven subject area groups of fiscal and policy
experts.
The Office serves as the legislature's "eyes and ears" to
ensure that the executive branch is implementing legislative
policy in a cost-efficient and effective manner. The Office
carries out this legislative oversight function by reviewing
and analyzing the operations and finances of state government. Historically, one of the most important responsibilities
of the LAO has been to analyze the annual Governor's Budget and publish a detailed review at the end of February. This

document, the Analysis of the Budget Imo o I
Bill, includes individual department re- [mooo i
views and recommendations for legislative action. A companion document, Perspectives and Issues, provides an overview of the state's fiscal picture and
identifies some of the major policy issues confronting the legislature. These documents help set the agenda for the work of
the legislature's fiscal committees in developing a state budget. LAO staff works with these committees throughout the
budget process and provides public testimony on the Office's
recommendations.
LAO also reviews requests by the administration to make
changes to the budget after it is enacted; prepares special reports on the state budget and topics of interest to the legislature; and prepares fiscal analyses of all proposed initiatives
(prior to circulation) and measures that qualify for the statewide ballot.
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